Scotus Tag

Home > Posts tagged "Scotus" (Page 3)

Posted 24 Jun 2021 in Case Notes Written by: Amanda Karras

In a 6-3 opinion the Supreme Court, likening the protection of property rights to the preservation of freedom, held in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid that a California regulation that provided union organizers access to agricultural employers’ property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year, was a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.  While the case was a loss for the State, looming larger in the case was the question of how the decision...

Posted 17 May 2021 in Case Notes, Commentary Written by: Amanda Karras

Today in a unanimous, but narrow opinion, the Supreme Court struck down the First Circuit’s expansion of the exception to the warrant requirement known as the “community care-taking doctrine” from automobiles to the home.  The Court left open the possibility that exigent circumstances might justify a search without a warrant under these circumstances, but that issue was not before the Court in this case. In this case, Kim Caniglia and her husband got in a fight during which he went and...

Posted 25 Mar 2021 in Case Notes, Commentary Written by: Amanda Karras

Today, in Torres v. Madrid, the Supreme Court provided a new rule for determining if a seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment where force is used, but a suspect gets away.  In a 5-3 ruling (Justice Barrett did not take part in the decision), the Court concluded that “[t]he application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.” In this case, two...

Posted 08 Mar 2021 in Case Notes, Commentary Written by: Amanda Karras

Today, in a 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski that an award of nominal damages on its own can redress a past injury in order to satisfy Article III, making it harder for local governments to dismiss a case based on a changed policy where no compensatory damages are at issue. In this case, Chike Uzuegbunam was a student at Georgia Gwinnett College. In 2016 campus police told him he could not distribute religious literature in an...

Posted 01 Dec 2020 in Case Notes, Commentary Written by: Amanda Karras

The day before Thanksgiving, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam (unsigned) 5-4 opinion enjoining New York from imposing its 10 and 25-person occupancy limits on religious institutions.  Specifically, New York imposed restrictions on attendance at religious services in areas classified as “red” or “orange” zones in the State. In red zones, no more than 10 persons may attend each religious service, and in orange zones, attendance is capped at 25.  Religious entities in the state challenged the order claiming...

Posted 23 Feb 2017 in Case Notes, Commentary
The fate of the most controversial case the Supreme Court has agreed to decide this term is uncertain now that the Department of Education (DOE) has issued a “Dear Colleague” letter withdrawing a previous letter requiring school districts to allow transgender students to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. Title IX prohibits school districts that receive federal funds from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” A Title IX regulation states if school districts maintain separate bathrooms (locker rooms, showers, etc.) “on the basis of sex” they must provide comparable facilities for the other sex. In a 2015 letter, DOE interpreted the Title IX regulation to mean that if schools provide for separate boys' and girls’ bathrooms, transgender students must be allowed to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. The new “Dear Colleague” letter takes no position on whether the term “sex” in Title IX includes gender identity. G.G. is biologically female but identifies as a male. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boys' bathroom. He sued the district arguing that it discriminated against him in violation of Title IX.

Posted 15 Feb 2017 in Case Notes, Commentary, IMLA Briefs
The Supreme Court accepts all kinds of cases involving states and local governments. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates involves a long, complicated story and legal issue. Steven Sherman sued the Town of Chester alleging an unconstitutional taking as the town refused to approve a subdivision on plots of land Sherman intended to sell to Laroe Estates. Laroe Estates advanced Sherman money for the land in exchange for a mortgage on the property. Sherman defaulted on a loan to a senior mortgage holder who foreclosed on the property. Laroe Estates, claiming to be the owner of the property, sought to “intervene” in the takings lawsuit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant the right to intervene to non-parties who “claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”  The district court concluded that Laroe Estates lacked Article III “standing” under the U.S. Constitution to assert a takings claim against the Town. Laroe Estates argued that it was a “contract vendee” of the Sherman property. According to the district court, under longstanding circuit court precedent “contract vendees lack standing to assert a takings claim.” The question the Supreme Court will decide in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates is whether Laroe Estates may intervene in this case even though it lacks standing.

Posted 10 Feb 2017 in Commentary

On February 9 the Ninth Circuit refused to stay a district court’s temporary restraining order disallowing the President’s travel ban from going into effect. The executive order prevents people from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days.

 Washington and Minnesota sued President Trump claiming their public universities are harmed because students and faculty of the affected countries cannot travel for research, academic collaboration, or personal reasons. The residents of cities and counties and their families have been affected as well by this executive order.  The government argued that the President has “unreviewable authority to suspend admissions of any class of aliens.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed stating: “There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewablity, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.”   The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the states are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the executive order violates the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, non-immigrant visa holders, and refugees. More specifically, the executive order provides no notice and hearing before restricting a person’s right to travel and “contravenes the procedures provided by federal statute for refugees seeking asylum.”

Posted 20 Jan 2015 in Case Notes, Commentary

On Friday the Supreme Court elevated this term from mostly meat and potatoes to historic by agreeing to hear four same-sex marriage cases.  The Court will decide whether it is constitutional for states to prohibit same-sex marriage and whether states may refuse to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed out of state.   While the Court refused to hear a number of cases presenting the same issues earlier in the term, these grants came as little surprise.  Between then and now the Sixth...

Posted 24 Dec 2014 in IMLA Briefs
The State and Local Legal Center’s (SLLC) Supreme Court amicus brief in Los Angeles v. Patel, which IMLA joined, is all that you expect from an amicus brief…and more.  It makes not one but all the usual amicus arguments:  don’t rule that state and local governments can be sued for yet another thing, if you rule against the city in this case many other cities and states will be affected, and a ruling against the city will likely impact many similar but unrelated statutes and ordinance. hotel    A Los Angeles ordinance requires hotel and motel operators to keep specific information about their guests and allows police to inspect the registries without warrants.  Motel operators claim this ordinance is facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit agreed, because the ordinance fails to expressly provide for pre-compliance judicial review before police can inspect the registry.    The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in Los Angeles v. Patel arguing that Fourth Amendment facial challenges should be disfavored and that if the ordinance in this case is unconstitutional similar hotel registry ordinances across the country—and laws and ordinances requiring record keeping and inspection of other businesses—may be unconstitutional.  A facial challenge to the ordinance in this case requires a court to determine whether all searches that might be conducted pursuant to the ordinance are unconstitutional (as opposed to an as-applied challenge where the court would decide whether a particular search under the ordinance violates the Fourth Amendment).  The SLLC argues that Fourth Amendment facial challenges don’t make sense because whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment depends on whether it is reasonable, which is necessarily a fact-based determination.  Under some set of facts almost any search would be reasonable.  For example, depending on the facts, warrantless searches of hotel registries could be reasonable under the “community care-taking exception,” because the registry is “in plain view,” or because of “exigent circumstances.”