Scotus Tag

Justice Kennedy is better known for his rhetorical flair than his practical guidance.church-state  But his majority opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway provides a roadmap local governments can follow to stay out of trouble when beginning city council meetings with a prayer. Town of Greece resolves two issues:  whether prayers must be nonsectarian and whether prayers before city council meetings are coercive. The Court concludes that sectarian prayers that overtly refer to a specific faith are okay—to a point.  Sectarian prayers can go too far

In our earlier post, we reported the Supreme Court’s decision in Greece v. Galloway, 8468059167_e8ebfeedbf_zruling that the Town’s prayer practice is not an unconstitutional establishment of religion. This post tracks some commentary on the case: SCOTUSblog has been providing analysis of the divided decision:
The stark difference between the majority opinion in the Allegheny County case and the Court’s new opinion in the Town of Greece case illustrated the progress made by Justice Kennedy toward the Court’s full embrace — although for differing reasons among five Justices who determined the outcome – of the “coercion” test in determining whether a government practice amounted to an “establishment of religion” in violation of the First Amendment.
Eugene Volokh of UCLA School of Law provides his reactions:

In addition to addressing local-government prayer this morning,CellTower the Supreme Court also decided to hear and answer another question impacting local governments: when a city denies a request to place a cell tower, how formally must it act? The Court granted cert in T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, No. 13-975, which specifically asks what a local government must do to satisfy the Communications Act's "in writing" requirement at 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii):
Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in its decision, some circuit courts have ruled

The Supreme Court has released its decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 8468059167_e8ebfeedbf_zconcluding that the Town's prayer practice has a "permissible ceremonial purpose" and is "not an unconstitutional establishment of religion." Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy ruled that the Town's prayer practice "fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures." Some highlights from his opinion:

Does an anonymous, unverified tip of dangerous driving justify a traffic stop? Yes, says a divided Supreme Court.highway stop In Prado Navarette v. California an anonymous 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road.  The Court held 5-4 that a police stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.  When police stopped the Navarette brothers they smelled marijuana.  A search of the vehicle revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The Court’s rationale, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, is as follows.  The tip of dangerous driving was sufficiently reliable because

The Supreme Court’s recent affirmative action ruling should be viewed through the lens of public employment not just public universities.Supreme Court3 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action the Supreme Court held 6-2 that voters may by ballot prohibit affirmative action in public universities admission decisions.  While this case was limited to the use of race in public university admission decisions, Michigan’s constitutional amendment also prohibits the use of racial-preference in state and local government employment and contracting.  Presumably, these provisions are also constitutional.  As NCSL’s Affirmative Action:  State Action chart describes, a number of states prohibit the use of affirmative action in local government employment and contracting. In 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger,

In Heien v. North Carolina a police officer pulled over a car because he thought that North Carolina law required that motor vehicles have two working brake lights. It turns out the officer was wrong. SupremeCourt2The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that state law requires motor vehicles to only have one working brake light. When the driver and the passenger offered different stories as to where they were going, the officer asked to search the vehicle. Consent was granted and cocaine was found. The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether a traffic stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when it is based on an officer’s misunderstanding of the law. The North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned

That question arises in Lane v. Franks, No. 13-483, a Supreme Court case in which IMLA and the International Public Management Association have now filed a brief.Supreme Court The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the termination did not trigger First-Amendment scrutiny:
No one disputes that Lane was acting pursuant to his official duties as CITY'S Director when he investigated Schmitz's work activities, spoke with Schmitz and other CACC officials about Schmitz's employment, and ultimately terminated Schmitz's employment. That Lane testified about his official activities pursuant to a subpoena and in the litigation context, in and of itself, does not bring Lane's speech within the protection of the First Amendment.

That is the question presented in SCOTUSblog's Petition of the Day.Supreme Court3 The Fourth Circuit ruled in Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013), that
absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.
Frederick County's cert petition argues that this creates a circuit split that the Court should resolve:

Congress grants a railroad a right-of-way across public land. RailroadROW The federal government then grants the land to a private landowner, who takes the parcel subject to the railroad right-of-way. The railroad later abandons the right-of-way. Does the right-of-way interest revert to the federal government? Or does the parcel owner gain full and unburdened rights to the property? This morning,  in Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, No. 12-1173, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the federal government does not retain an interest in the abandoned right-of-way.  As Chief Justice Roberts explained,