Title VII Tag

Today, in a 6-3 opinion in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, the Supreme Court created a new standard under Title VII for employee transfers, rejecting any heightened harm requirement – such as materiality or significant disadvantage - that lower courts have applied.  However, the Court did not go so far as to adopt the Petitioner’s proposed rule in the case which would have found any transfer, regardless of harm would be actionable under Title VII if based on a...

Today, in an important employment law case, a unanimous Supreme Court “clarified” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison’s “more than . . . de minimis” language, concluding that it does not suffice to establish an “undue hardship” under Title VII.  Instead, the Court held that to demonstrate an “undue hardship,” an employer must show “a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.”  While the Court did not overrule Hardison, this clarification of its meaning will likely...

The Supreme Court held in a 6-3 opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, that an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.  Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch explains “[s]ex plays a necessary and undisguisable role” in an employer’s decision to “fire an individual for being homosexual or transgender”, which is “exactly what Title VII forbids.” The textualist opinion includes numerous examples of why it is “impossible to discriminate against a person for being...

Before an employee alleging employment discrimination under Title VII (on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) may bring a lawsuit in federal court he or she must file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis the Supreme Court held unanimously that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a “mandatory procedural prescription” that a court must consider if timely raised (but may be forfeited if not timely asserted). The State and Local Legal Center...

The Seventh Circuit has become the first federal circuit court of appeals to rule that employees may bring sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. This case directly affects state and local governments in their capacity as employers in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Kimberly Hively is openly lesbian. She sued Ivy Tech Community College where she taught as a part-time, adjunct professor. She applied for at least six full-time positions between 2009 and 2014, didn’t receive any of them, and in July 2014, her part-time contract was not renewed. She believes her sexual orientation is the reason. The Seventh Circuit had long held that sexual orientation discrimination claims weren’t cognizable under Title VII. The court decided to revisit this conclusion “in light of developments at the Supreme Court extending over two decades.” These decisions include Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which granted same-sex couples a constitutional right to marry. 

The Supreme Court’s final employment case of the term is a loss for all employers—not just clothing retailers that impose their fashion sense on their employees. As Justice Thomas points out in his dissenting opinion, rather remarkably, it leaves open the possibility that an employer can be liable for intentional discrimination for failing to accommodate a practice it did not know or even suspect was religious. In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores the Supreme Court held 8-1 that to bring a religious accommodation claim an applicant or employee need only show that his or her need for a religious accommodation was a motivating factor in an employment decision. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief, which IMLA attorneys wrote, arguing that to bring a failure to accommodate claim the applicant/employee should have to notify the employer of the need for a religious accommodation.

It is a rare Supreme Court case where employers and arguably employees both won (and the Court doesn’t “split the baby” and rule partially in favor of each party).  In Mach Mining v. EEOC the only clear losing party is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Supreme Court held unanimously that a court may review whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt to conciliate employment discrimination claims before filing a lawsuit. The Court’s decision is favorable to employers, including state and local governments, who benefit from the EEOC’s statutory mandate to try to resolve employment discrimination cases before suing employers. If the EEOC fails to try to conciliate employers may sue the EEOC. Employees benefit from conciliation because it is faster and less demanding that litigation.

Young v. United Parcel Service presents a dilemma most employers, including states, can relate to.  What should an employer do if a pregnant employee’s job requires that she lift an amount well above what her doctor has approved during pregnancy? The specific issue the Court had to decide in this case was whether an employer violated Title VII because it accommodated many but not all nonpregnancy-related disabilities but did not accommodate pregnancy-related disabilities.  Maybe, the Supreme Court ruled in a 6-3 decision.

Here are last week's published decisions involving local governments:court collumn Second Circuit
  • Raspardo v. Carlone, No. 12-1686 (Oct. 6, 2014): In 1983 Title VII employment discrimination case brought by female police officers alleging hostile work environment and disparate treatment, the court affirmed denial of qualified immunity for one officer on hostile-work-environment claim, and reversed denial of qualified immunity for other officers.
  • Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, No. 13-2911 (Oct. 2, 2014): In case in which  City denied request for facility to provide care for those recovering from alcohol and drug abuse because facility did not satisfy zoning requirements, the court affirmed district court's determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over ADA suit. Suit was not ripe because applicant had not sought variance or appealed the zoning decision.
  • Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, No. 13-656 (Sept. 29, 2014): The court affirmed dismissal of 1983 action after it determined that private emergency medical care and general ambulance services contracted for by municipality do not constitute "state action."
Seventh Circuit

Here are last week's published decisions involving local governments:court collumn First Circuit
  • Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Finance Agency, No. 13-2034 (Aug. 27, 2014): The court affirmed the dismissal of the municipalities' claim that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac failed to pay taxes on property transfers; the court found that statutory exemptions from taxation applied. As the court put it: "Six other circuits have recently considered this attempt to shoe-horn a transfer tax into a real property tax, and they have unanimously rejected the argument."
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