Supreme Court Tag

In our earlier post, we reported the Supreme Court’s decision in Greece v. Galloway, 8468059167_e8ebfeedbf_zruling that the Town’s prayer practice is not an unconstitutional establishment of religion. This post tracks some commentary on the case: SCOTUSblog has been providing analysis of the divided decision:
The stark difference between the majority opinion in the Allegheny County case and the Court’s new opinion in the Town of Greece case illustrated the progress made by Justice Kennedy toward the Court’s full embrace — although for differing reasons among five Justices who determined the outcome – of the “coercion” test in determining whether a government practice amounted to an “establishment of religion” in violation of the First Amendment.
Eugene Volokh of UCLA School of Law provides his reactions:

Given the Supreme Court’s prominent role in deciding important issues of the day, it is easy to get caught up in the latest juicy Court mishappollutionJustice Scalia erroneously depicted precedent in his dissent in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, which had to be corrected. But don’t let that be the reason you read this blog post.  This case is important for local governments. The Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision prohibits upwind states from emitting air pollution in amounts that will contribute significantly to downwind states failing to attain air quality standards.  In EPA v. EME Homer City Generation the Supreme Court resolved two issues related to the Good Neighbor Provision.  Justice Ginsburg wrote the 6-2 opinion. The Court first considered how responsibility for air pollution should be allocated.

Does an anonymous, unverified tip of dangerous driving justify a traffic stop? Yes, says a divided Supreme Court.highway stop In Prado Navarette v. California an anonymous 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road.  The Court held 5-4 that a police stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.  When police stopped the Navarette brothers they smelled marijuana.  A search of the vehicle revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The Court’s rationale, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, is as follows.  The tip of dangerous driving was sufficiently reliable because

The Supreme Court’s recent affirmative action ruling should be viewed through the lens of public employment not just public universities.Supreme Court3 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action the Supreme Court held 6-2 that voters may by ballot prohibit affirmative action in public universities admission decisions.  While this case was limited to the use of race in public university admission decisions, Michigan’s constitutional amendment also prohibits the use of racial-preference in state and local government employment and contracting.  Presumably, these provisions are also constitutional.  As NCSL’s Affirmative Action:  State Action chart describes, a number of states prohibit the use of affirmative action in local government employment and contracting. In 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger,

7432008582_3c5d6429f6_nBy Lisa Soronen [We are thrilled to have a guest post from Lisa Soronen, executive director of the State and Local Legal Center.] Last week, the Supreme Court struck down aggregate limits on individual contributions to candidates for federal office, political parties, and political action committees. McCutcheon v. FEC will likely impact the dozen or so states that place aggregate limits on individual campaign contributions to candidates for state office. A cursory glance at state campaign finance laws regulating local elections indicates that states generally have not adopted aggregate caps meaning this decision will not affect contributions to local elections. Federal law allows

This morning, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Frederick County v. Santos, No. 13-706, a case involving whether local officials may arrest persons for immigration violations that we discussed here. See additional coverage from The Frederick News-Post here. (Photo courtesy of Flickr by Mark Fischer, creative-commons license, no changes made)....

Be sure to check out details of the Supreme Court Practice Seminar that IMLA and the State and Local Legal Center will host on March 4, 2014. Lisa Soronen, executive director of the State and Local Legal Center, has invited some remarkable Supreme Court practitioners. It is a can't-miss program for anyone intersted in the Court. You can register here....

In a unanimous decision released Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) applies in only three “exceptional circumstances.”  The Court previously identified those exceptional circumstances in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (NOPSI) (1989). This week, it confirmed, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs et al., that Younger abstention extends no further. Supreme Court The Court reaffirmed that Younger abstention is appropriate, and federal courts should defer to state courts, only when faced with:
  1.  “state criminal prosecutions,”
  2. “civil enforcement proceedings,” or
  3. “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
If none of those exceptional circumstances is present, the federal courts may not invoke Younger abstention. As we discussed previously, Sprint involved two separate actions that Sprint Communications, Inc. initiated against members of the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), one pending in Iowa state court and the other in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.  In both actions,

We've talked before about how Justice Kagan is one of the Supreme Court's most interesting writers. A thoughtful new article by Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan's Supreme Court Opinions, builds upon that topic by exploring some of Justice Kagan's most effective writing tools. Here are a few that make Justice Kagan's work so reader-friendly:Official Informal Portrait choice Kagan often opens a sentence with a direct invocation to the reader:
  • "Consider first what the two statutes tell a slaughterhouse to do"
  • "Imagine the converse of the statute described above"
  • "Pretend you are financing your campaign through private donations."
She uses a "generous sprinking" of informal and even colloquial diction: