Posted 05 Jan 2014 in Monday Morning Review

Happy New Year to all of our readers. Last week was a slow one for the courts. The only significant action for local governments came from the Ninth Circuit: The court granted rehearing en banc in Valenzuela v. Maricopa County, No. 11-16847 (Jan. 2, 2014). The case involves the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100, which provides that Arizona state courts may not set bail "[f]or serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and...

Posted 29 Dec 2013 in Monday Morning Review

Here are published decisions involving local governments from the federal appellate courts from December 23, 2013, through December 27, 2013: Seventh Circuit Swetlik v. Crawford, No. 12-2675 (Dec. 23, 2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment against police detective who sued City and officers alleging that they violated his First-Amendment rights by voting to file a termination charge against him). DeKalb County v. Federal Housing Finance Authority, No. 1301558 (Dec. 23, 2013) (holding that Fannie Mae is exempt by statute from real-estate transfer taxes levied...

Posted 23 Dec 2013 in Roundup

Be sure to check out details of the Supreme Court Practice Seminar that IMLA and the State and Local Legal Center will host on March 4, 2014. Lisa Soronen, executive director of the State and Local Legal Center, has invited some remarkable Supreme Court practitioners. It is a can't-miss program for anyone intersted in the Court. You can register here....

Posted 23 Dec 2013 in Monday Morning Review
Here are published decisions involving local governments from the federal appellate courts from December 16, 2013, through December 20, 2013: Sixth Circuit Seventh Circuit Eighth Circuit

Posted 16 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
When T-Mobile sought to place a cell tower in a park owned by the City of Huntington Beach, California, the City granted the company all the regulatory approvals it required. But the City also informed T-Mobile that before it would finally lease the company the rights to the City property that it needed, the company must first obtain approval from City voters, under an amendment to the City charter known as Measure C.CellTower T-Mobile refused. It claimed that Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7),  preempts this City requirement. Is T-Mobile correct? Not according to the Ninth Circuit, which decided Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, No. 10-56877 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) last week. The court ruled that because Section 332(c)(7) "applies only to local zoning and land use decisions and does not address a municipality's property rights as a landowner," it does not preempt this local requirement, which concerns only how the City may lease its property. Enacted in 1990, Measure C states:

Posted 16 Dec 2013 in Monday Morning Review

Here are published decisions involving local governments from the federal appellate courts from December 9, 2013, through December 13, 2013: Sixth Circuit Henschel v. Clare County Road Commission, No. 13-1528 (Dec. 13, 2013) (in ADA claim brought by individual not permitted to return to work after accident, reversing grant of summary judgment to road commission because genuine issues of material fact remained about whether individual was qualified). Seventh Circuit Jones v. City of Elkhart, No. 12-3912 (Dec. 12, 2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment for City...

Posted 12 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
In a unanimous decision released Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) applies in only three “exceptional circumstances.”  The Court previously identified those exceptional circumstances in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (NOPSI) (1989). This week, it confirmed, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs et al., that Younger abstention extends no further. Supreme Court The Court reaffirmed that Younger abstention is appropriate, and federal courts should defer to state courts, only when faced with:
  1.  “state criminal prosecutions,”
  2. “civil enforcement proceedings,” or
  3. “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
If none of those exceptional circumstances is present, the federal courts may not invoke Younger abstention. As we discussed previously, Sprint involved two separate actions that Sprint Communications, Inc. initiated against members of the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), one pending in Iowa state court and the other in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.  In both actions,

Posted 09 Dec 2013 in Monday Morning Review

Here are published decisions involving local governments from the federal appellate courts from November 25, 2013 through December 6, 2013: Second Circuit American Petroleum and Transport v. City of New York, No. 12-4505 (Dec. 6, 2013) (finding that vessel owner may not be awarded damages for economic loss due to negligence in the absence of physical damage to property). Fourth Circuit Sandslands C&D LLC v. County of Horry, No. 13-1134 (Dec. 3, 2013) (affirming that County waste-disposal ordinance does not violate Dormant Commerce or...

Posted 05 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
If a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his supervisor, and the employee is removed from duty for raising those concerns, does the employee have a viable First Amendment retaliation claim?Policecar In Hagen v. City of Eugene, No. 12-35492 (Dec. 3, 2013), the Ninth Circuit ruled that a public employee did not have a viable First Amendment claim under the particular circumstances there. The court ruled that, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the employee, he was speaking as a public employee, not a private citizen. The case involved a City police officer, Brian Hagen, who noticed that members of his SWAT team were often firing their weapons accidentally and negigently. Hagen tried to make his concerns about the team "as public as possible" by sending e-mails and raising the issue  in meetings. Eventually, Hagen was removed from the K-9 team. Hagen claimed that the City and senior officers had retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.

Posted 03 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
A County ordinance provides that waste generated in the County can be disposed at only a single location -- a publicly owned landfill:Landfill
The dumping or depositing by any person at any place other than at the designated facilities of any acceptable waste generated within the County is prohibited.
The County crafted the ordinance to further many public benefits: to conserve resources, to prevent pollution, and to protect the public health, safety, and well-being. For the public landfill, the ordinance also ensured a revenue stream. But for a private landfill operator located just two miles from the County line, the ordinance was a real problem. The ordinance led to a significant decrease in its business. The operator sued the County. It argued that the County ordinance violates the dormant-commerce clause and the equal-protection clause of the federal constitution. Is the operator correct? In Sandlands C&D LLC v. County of Horry, No. 13-1134 (Dec. 3, 2013), the Fourth Circuit ruled against the operator. It upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment for the County. Applying the Supreme Court's decision in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007), the court ruled that