Case Notes

The Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.Handgun We know that now—after decades of uncertainty—because the Supreme Court said so in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). But how far does the Second Amendment extend? Does it prevent a City from regulating the storage of handguns in homes or the sale of ammunition that expands upon impact, referrred to as hollow-point bullets? In a case decided this week, Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 12-17803 (Mar. 25, 2014), the Ninth Circuit ruled that those bringing a Second-Amendment challenge to the City and County of San Francisco's handgun and ammunition regulations were not likely to succeed on the merits. What exactly was at issue and how did the court reach its conclusions?

That is the question presented in SCOTUSblog's Petition of the Day.Supreme Court3 The Fourth Circuit ruled in Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013), that
absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.
Frederick County's cert petition argues that this creates a circuit split that the Court should resolve:

Congress grants a railroad a right-of-way across public land. RailroadROW The federal government then grants the land to a private landowner, who takes the parcel subject to the railroad right-of-way. The railroad later abandons the right-of-way. Does the right-of-way interest revert to the federal government? Or does the parcel owner gain full and unburdened rights to the property? This morning,  in Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, No. 12-1173, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the federal government does not retain an interest in the abandoned right-of-way.  As Chief Justice Roberts explained,

The Ninth Circuit has denied the sua sponte call for en banc review in Pacific Shore Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, No. 11-55460, a case that we have written about previously hereNinthCircuitJudge O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Tallman, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta, filed a dissental, that is, a dissent from the denial of en banc review. It appears to be telegraphing that the Supreme Court should consider the case:

The panel’s opinion in these consolidated cases invents an entirely unprecedented theory of actionable government discrimination: sinister intent in the enactment of facially neutral legislation can generate civil liability without evidence of discriminatory effect. Such unwarranted expansion

Last year, this blog discussed three recent courts of appeals decisions involving local-housing regulations aimed at a person's immigration status. This morning, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two of the cases,  Farmers Branch v. Villas at Parkside and Hazleton v. Lozano. Both decisions had preempted local ordinances. Image courtesy of Flickr by prathap ramamurthy (creative-commons license, no changes made)....

Closed signMay a city require adult bookstores but not other establishments to close between midnight and 10am every night and all day Sunday? In Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis, No. 13-1500 (Jan. 24, 2014), the Seventh Circuit said no. It struck down the City of Indianapolis's requirement, which a district court had previously upheld. Although the City claimed that the restriction would lead to fewer armed robberies at or near the bookstores, the court held that "cities must protect readers from robbers rather than reduce risks by closing bookstores." In the court's view, "[t]hat the City's regulation takes the form of closure is the nub of the problem." First, the court found that the evidence supporting the City's justification is "weak as a statistical matter": the data "do not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets." Second, the court noted that although

This morning, the Supreme Court called for the views of the United States Solicitor General ("CVSG") on whether the Court should grant cert in Comptroller of the Treasury of Md v. Wynne, No. 13-485. The case concerns how the dormant commerce clause limits local taxation. The Court uses the CVSG procedure with respect to only about 10 petitions a year. It indicates at least some degree of interest: the chances of a cert-grant increase significantly in such cases. IMLA and its partners filed the only amicus brief in the case, which...

Local governments often establish fixed buffer zones to eliminate congestion and to ensure public safety. Does the First Amendment require a significant change in current local practices?Barricade Next Wednesday, January 15th, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that could address that question. McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 concerns whether a Massachusetts law that bars entering or remaining within a 35-foot radius of a reproductive-health-care facility violates the First Amendment. The First Circuit upheld the law as a reasonable, content-neutral limit. Local governments have filed two important amicus curiae briefs in the case. First, IMLA joined the National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, the International City/County Management Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors in a brief urging the Court to respect state and local governments' need to establish buffer zones to protect public safety. The brief offers a number of examples

When T-Mobile sought to place a cell tower in a park owned by the City of Huntington Beach, California, the City granted the company all the regulatory approvals it required. But the City also informed T-Mobile that before it would finally lease the company the rights to the City property that it needed, the company must first obtain approval from City voters, under an amendment to the City charter known as Measure C.CellTower T-Mobile refused. It claimed that Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7),  preempts this City requirement. Is T-Mobile correct? Not according to the Ninth Circuit, which decided Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, No. 10-56877 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) last week. The court ruled that because Section 332(c)(7) "applies only to local zoning and land use decisions and does not address a municipality's property rights as a landowner," it does not preempt this local requirement, which concerns only how the City may lease its property. Enacted in 1990, Measure C states: