Case Notes

Last Monday’s Supreme Court “long conference” did not disappoint.  The Supreme Court granted a total of 11 petitions.Supreme Court3  At least four of those cases are relevant to local government. Housing discrimination.  For the third time the Court has accepted a case involving this issue of whether disparate-impact (as opposed to disparate treatment) claims can be brought under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).  It remains to be seen if Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project will settle like its predecessors, Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Citizens in Action and Magner v. Gallagher.  The 11 federal circuits that have decided this issue have all held that disparate-impact claims are actionable.  The Supreme Court is expected to rule to the contrary.  Local government have been sued for disparate impact under the FHA and have sued other entities. Fourth Amendment search.  In its second Fourth Amendment case of the term, Rodriguez v. United States, the Court will decide whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by extending (for just a few minutes) an already-completed traffic stop for a dog sniff.  The Eighth Circuit held the search in this case was reasonable.  The police officer waited seven or eight minutes after the traffic stop was completed before deploying his sniffer dog because he wanted backup given that there were two people in the stopped car. Employment discrimination

If your medicine cabinet is filled with old prescriptions and other medications that you no longer want or can use, you might have asked: how and where should I get rid of these? Pills Local governments are beginning to provide an answer. Old medications are not only misused, they also pose dangers for the environment. Flushing pills or putting them in the trash can contaminate drinking water and cause other environmental problems. But disposal programs can be expensive. What's a local government to do? Alameda County, California, devised a solution. It passed a Safe Drug Disposal Ordinance that requires any prescription drug producer who sells, offers for sale, or distributes drugs in the County to participate in a program to collect and dispose of the County's unwanted drugs. Manufacturers and distributors objected, however. They claimed that requiring them to pay for the program violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against or directly regulates interstate commerce. Are they right? On Tuesday, the Ninth Circuit said that the program does not violate the Commerce Clause. The court ruled that

While the Supreme Court’s next term officially begins on October 6, its “long conference” is September 29.  At this conference the Court will review a backlog of petitions that have been piling up over the summer.  SCOTUSblog complies a list of petitions that it thinks have a reasonable chance of being granted.  Eight of the petitions the Court will consider either during the “long conference” or at a later conference directly involve or impact local governments.5554035521_f6b59ccafa_n Public nuisance.  A Brighton, Michigan, ordinance presumes that an unsafe structure will be demolished as a public nuisance if the cost of repairing it exceeds its value.  The owner has no right to repair the structure.  Brighton property owners wanted to repair two unsafe structures even though Brighton estimated it would cost almost double the property value do so.  In Bonner v. City of Brighton, Michigan, the property owners claim the ordinance violates substantive and procedural due process. Employment.  Under federal employment law to bring a discrimination claim a plaintiff must prove that an “adverse action” occurred, and to bring a retaliation claim a plaintiff must prove a “materially adverse action” occurred.  The question in Kalamazoo County Road Commission v. Deleon is whether either can be proven when an employer grants an employee’s request for a job transfer (and the new position turns out to be less desirable than the old position).  The International Municipal Lawyers Association (IMLA) filed an amicus brief in this case.

[Editor's Note: My colleague, Gary Schons, contributed this post. We hope to have more posts from Gary in the future. --Matt Schettenhelm] One thing common to all appellate lawyers--- they love to appeal.Gavel But, as all appellate lawyers know, the right to appeal is fixed by statute. (Trede v. Superior Court (1943) 21 Cal.2d 630.) Thus, our ability to practice our craft is dependent on the leave granted by the legislature. In this case, the issue before a California appellate court was whether a specific provision of the anti-SLAPP statute granting the right to an immediate appeal of an order granting or denying a special motion is effectively nullified by a separate provision of the statute making it wholly inapplicable to enforcement actions brought by state, county or city prosecutors. As the appellate court noted in the preamble to its decision, this issue was “thoroughly briefed,” and perhaps ominously, oral argument was “vigorous indeed.” I’ll bet it was.

Even though the Supreme Court’s next term won’t officially begin until October 6, the Court has already accepted about 40 of the 70 or so cases it will decide in the upcoming months. For a more detailed summary of all the cases the Court has accepted so far affecting local government, read the State and Local Legal Center’s Supreme Court Preview for Local Governments.Supreme Court3 Here is a quick highlight of what is on the Court’s docket right now that will affect local government:

As usual, on the last day of the Supreme Court’s term it released its opinion in the biggest case of the term:  Burwell v. Hobby LobbyGavel The Court held 5-4 that the Affordable Care Act’s birth control mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), as applied to closely held corporations. Though not obvious, this case may have a significant impact on land use regulation.  For this reason, the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief, which Justice Ginsburg quoted in her dissenting opinion.

In a unanimous opinion in McCullen v. Coakley,Supreme Court3 the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts statute making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within 35 feet of an abortion clinic violates the First Amendment. Massachusetts adopted this statute because protesters routinely violated a previous statute.  Petitioners were “sidewalk counselors” who claimed the buffer zones prevented them from having personal interactions with those entering the clinics which they viewed as essential to their “sidewalk counseling.” The State and Local Legal Center’s (SLLC) amicus brief points out that cities frequently use buffer zones in numerous contextsFor example, prior to McCullen, lower courts upheld buffer zones to prevent congestion at special events and places that regularly draw crowds and near funerals to protect vulnerable mourners.  McCullen begs an obvious question:  will any buffer zone statutes and ordinances survive constitutional scrutiny now?

This morning, the Supreme Court granted cert in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, a case in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the Town of Gilbert's sign ordinance against a First-Amendment challenge.SupremeCourt2 The case could directly impact local governments nationwide, particularly those that have adopted sign ordinances with exemptions. The Court could use this case to clarify when a local ordinance is "content-based" or "content-neutral," a key inquiry under the First-Amendment analysis. A number of law professors filed an amicus brief authored by Professor Eugene Volokh arguing that the Ninth Circuit erred by treating the Town's ordinance as content-neutral. In their view, the ordinance is content-based because it expressly distinguishes the following classes of signs:

Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!  1 Block --> So reads the sign—decorated with a gold cross and white Bible—that the Borough of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania, allowed to be placed on its right-of-way.church-state A nearby resident, Francene Tearpock-Martini, objected. She sued the Borough under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the sign violates the Establishment Clause. Tearpock-Martini's lawsuit had a problem though. Tearpock-Martini had commenced the suit more than two years after the church sign was installed. Under Pennsylvania law, tort actions generally must be brought within two years. And 1983 actions often borrow the statute of limitations from state law. Is her suit time-barred? In a decision this week, the Third Circuit said that it is not:

BarricadeA local government can create a 35-foot buffer zone to restrict speech on a public street only if it has first made a serious effort to address the issue in other ways. That's the lesson of McCullen v. Coakley, the Supreme-Court decision today that strikes down a Massachusetts statute that makes it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of a location where abortions are performed. Although the Court found that the law is content-neutral—and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny—the Court ruled that the Commonwealth had "too readily foregone options" that would not substantially burden speech. What are those options?