Case Notes

Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!  1 Block --> So reads the sign—decorated with a gold cross and white Bible—that the Borough of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania, allowed to be placed on its right-of-way.church-state A nearby resident, Francene Tearpock-Martini, objected. She sued the Borough under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the sign violates the Establishment Clause. Tearpock-Martini's lawsuit had a problem though. Tearpock-Martini had commenced the suit more than two years after the church sign was installed. Under Pennsylvania law, tort actions generally must be brought within two years. And 1983 actions often borrow the statute of limitations from state law. Is her suit time-barred? In a decision this week, the Third Circuit said that it is not:

BarricadeA local government can create a 35-foot buffer zone to restrict speech on a public street only if it has first made a serious effort to address the issue in other ways. That's the lesson of McCullen v. Coakley, the Supreme-Court decision today that strikes down a Massachusetts statute that makes it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of a location where abortions are performed. Although the Court found that the law is content-neutral—and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny—the Court ruled that the Commonwealth had "too readily foregone options" that would not substantially burden speech. What are those options?

Supreme Court watchers love technology cases.Supreme Court Technology is for the young, so the cliché goes, and the youngest Justices are middle age.  Court watchers speculate, will the Justices even understand the technology they are ruling? Justice Robert’s 28-page opinion in Riley v. California, discussing encryption, apps, and cloud computing, reads like a primer on how cell phones work. The Court held unanimously that generally police must first obtain a warrant before searching an arrested person’s cellphone.

Had Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA gone the other way, it would be a big deal for cities.352250460_ee2f9e5565  But it didn’t. Cities own many small stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases and will benefit from not having to obtain permits for them. The Clean Air Act regulates pollution-generating emissions from stationary source (factories, power plants, etc.) and moving sources (cars, trucks, planes, etc.).  In 2007

The Supreme Court held unanimously that the First Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by a subpoena, outside the course of his or her ordinary responsibilities.5554035521_f6b59ccafa_n The good:  The Court was clear that if employees admit to wrongdoing while testifying they can still be disciplined and that false or erroneous testimony or testimony that unnecessarily discloses sensitive, confidential, or privileged information may balance the Pickering scale in the employer’s favor. The bad:  The Court read “official job duties” narrowly to exclude speech about information merely learned at the job. The ugly:  The Court doesn’t decide the obvious next question:  is an employee’s truthful sworn testimony, which is part of an employee’s ordinary responsibilities, protected by the First Amendment?

If you eat, talk on the phone, and escape the rain in your car, are you using the car "as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise?"Homelesscar What if you load up the car with personal belongings for a camping trip? Or drive an RV to go on vacation? In the Ninth Circuit's view, a City of Los Angeles code provision designed to outlaw sleeping in a vehicle on City streets and parking lots may or may not criminalize all these activities and could lead to other selective enforcement—particularly against the homeless and poor. The court therefore ruled that the provision is unconstitutionally vague. The decision is Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, No. 11-56957 (June 19, 2014). Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 85.02 outlaws

This morning, the Supreme Court decided Lane v. Franks, a case that this blog previously covered here. The Court ruled unanimously that the First Amendment protects a public employee who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the course of his ordinary job responsibilities. Image courtesy of Flickr by Mark Fischer (creative-commons license, no changes made)....

If preemption is your passion, this Supreme Court term has been a disappointment.Supreme Court3 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger is one of just two preemption cases this term. To the extent local governments benefit from decisions finding no preemption, this case is a victory. But practically speaking, it is probably a Pyrrhic one. In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, the Supreme Court held 7-2 that the federal Superfund statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), does not preempt state statutes of repose.

Imagine yourself going through a security screening. Annoying, right?  securityNow imagine yourself getting paid to go through a security screening.  Better, right?  But what if you are a city with a security screening process that as a result of a court decision must now pay employees to go through security screenings?  Sometime in the next year, the Supreme Court will affirm or reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision to this effect in Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk. In this case the Supreme Court will decide whether hourly employees must be paid for time spent in security screenings under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 

In a unanimous decision published yesterday,camera the California Supreme Court concluded that the evidence generated by an automated traffic enforcement system (ATES) was adequately authenticated by the testimony of a city officer, and that the ATES evidence did not constitute hearsay. The defendant in People v. Goldsmith was cited for failing to stop at a red traffic light at an intersection located in the City of Inglewood. The evidence presented against her included several photographs and a 12-second video, all of which were generated by an ATES. Only one witness testified at the defendant’s trial,