Commentary

String cites are almost universally condemned.  paperJudges at all levels criticize string cites.  Minority and dissenting judges criticize majorities that use string cites, and vice versa but to a lesser extent.  Attorneys criticize the string cites in their opponents’ briefs.  Law reviews insult string cites routinely. What distinguishes a string cite from a list of cases that support the stated proposition?

When is a judgment a judgment for purposes of res judicata or the doctrine of full faith and credit when the judgment is obtained in one court and sought to be enforced in a different court?  Dictionary Many possible answers come to mind: when the judgment is entered, when the time for appeal has elapsed, during the pendency of an appeal for which no supersedeas bond was provided, when any appeal of the judgment is finished, when the judgment is final in the court that entered it, when the judgment is final in the court in which enforcement is sought. There may be a State and a circumstance in which every one of these possible answers is the right answer.

Justice Kennedy is better known for his rhetorical flair than his practical guidance.church-state  But his majority opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway provides a roadmap local governments can follow to stay out of trouble when beginning city council meetings with a prayer. Town of Greece resolves two issues:  whether prayers must be nonsectarian and whether prayers before city council meetings are coercive. The Court concludes that sectarian prayers that overtly refer to a specific faith are okay—to a point.  Sectarian prayers can go too far

In our earlier post, we reported the Supreme Court’s decision in Greece v. Galloway, 8468059167_e8ebfeedbf_zruling that the Town’s prayer practice is not an unconstitutional establishment of religion. This post tracks some commentary on the case: SCOTUSblog has been providing analysis of the divided decision:
The stark difference between the majority opinion in the Allegheny County case and the Court’s new opinion in the Town of Greece case illustrated the progress made by Justice Kennedy toward the Court’s full embrace — although for differing reasons among five Justices who determined the outcome – of the “coercion” test in determining whether a government practice amounted to an “establishment of religion” in violation of the First Amendment.
Eugene Volokh of UCLA School of Law provides his reactions:

Given the Supreme Court’s prominent role in deciding important issues of the day, it is easy to get caught up in the latest juicy Court mishappollutionJustice Scalia erroneously depicted precedent in his dissent in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, which had to be corrected. But don’t let that be the reason you read this blog post.  This case is important for local governments. The Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision prohibits upwind states from emitting air pollution in amounts that will contribute significantly to downwind states failing to attain air quality standards.  In EPA v. EME Homer City Generation the Supreme Court resolved two issues related to the Good Neighbor Provision.  Justice Ginsburg wrote the 6-2 opinion. The Court first considered how responsibility for air pollution should be allocated.

Does an anonymous, unverified tip of dangerous driving justify a traffic stop? Yes, says a divided Supreme Court.highway stop In Prado Navarette v. California an anonymous 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road.  The Court held 5-4 that a police stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.  When police stopped the Navarette brothers they smelled marijuana.  A search of the vehicle revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The Court’s rationale, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, is as follows.  The tip of dangerous driving was sufficiently reliable because

The Supreme Court’s recent affirmative action ruling should be viewed through the lens of public employment not just public universities.Supreme Court3 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action the Supreme Court held 6-2 that voters may by ballot prohibit affirmative action in public universities admission decisions.  While this case was limited to the use of race in public university admission decisions, Michigan’s constitutional amendment also prohibits the use of racial-preference in state and local government employment and contracting.  Presumably, these provisions are also constitutional.  As NCSL’s Affirmative Action:  State Action chart describes, a number of states prohibit the use of affirmative action in local government employment and contracting. In 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger,

7432008582_3c5d6429f6_nBy Lisa Soronen [We are thrilled to have a guest post from Lisa Soronen, executive director of the State and Local Legal Center.] Last week, the Supreme Court struck down aggregate limits on individual contributions to candidates for federal office, political parties, and political action committees. McCutcheon v. FEC will likely impact the dozen or so states that place aggregate limits on individual campaign contributions to candidates for state office. A cursory glance at state campaign finance laws regulating local elections indicates that states generally have not adopted aggregate caps meaning this decision will not affect contributions to local elections. Federal law allows

One of the significant Supreme Court cases affecting local governments this term has been resolved through settlement. The case is Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action. It asked whether a plaintiff bringing a claim under the Fair Housing Act must show intentional discrimination, or whether a "disparate impact" is sufficient. This marks the second time that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question but then not been able to resolve it. Magner v. Gallagher was also settled last year....