Case Notes

Home > Case Notes (Page 24)

Posted 03 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
A County ordinance provides that waste generated in the County can be disposed at only a single location -- a publicly owned landfill:Landfill
The dumping or depositing by any person at any place other than at the designated facilities of any acceptable waste generated within the County is prohibited.
The County crafted the ordinance to further many public benefits: to conserve resources, to prevent pollution, and to protect the public health, safety, and well-being. For the public landfill, the ordinance also ensured a revenue stream. But for a private landfill operator located just two miles from the County line, the ordinance was a real problem. The ordinance led to a significant decrease in its business. The operator sued the County. It argued that the County ordinance violates the dormant-commerce clause and the equal-protection clause of the federal constitution. Is the operator correct? In Sandlands C&D LLC v. County of Horry, No. 13-1134 (Dec. 3, 2013), the Fourth Circuit ruled against the operator. It upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment for the County. Applying the Supreme Court's decision in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007), the court ruled that

Posted 25 Nov 2013 in Case Notes
A City ordinance bans smoking in most bars and taverns. Does this violate bar owners' federal constitutional rights? Not according to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, No. 13-1629, released today.Nosmoking The court rejected the bar owners' evidentiary claims and state-law claims. It also found that the ordinance does not violate the owners' substantive due process rights:

Because it does not infringe a fundamental right, the smoking ordinance will stand if it passes rational basis scrutiny. . . .The bar owners have failed to meet this heavy burden. There are numerous reasons the City may have chosen to limit smoking in enclosed public spaces, and the bar owners have failed to disprove all of them.

Posted 25 Nov 2013 in Case Notes

Many cities have struggled with the effects of foreclosures. But given the complex mix of state laws that often governs the issue, how much authority do local governments have in this area? A First Circuit case, Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield, No. 12-1917 (Nov. 22, 2013) addresses that question. Six banks sued the City of Springfield, Massachusetts, after it had adopted two foreclosure ordinances. The ordinances require: banks to maintain property during the foreclosure process and to provide a $10,000 cash bond to the City; and banks and...

Posted 11 Nov 2013 in Case Notes

In Balthazar v. City of Chicago, No. 12-3378 (Nov. 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit addressed an interesting Fourth-Amendment question: is it a "search" for officers to mistakenly open the wrong apartment door and glance inside? Judge Posner said that in this case, it likely was not: Police forced open the door of a residence by mistake, realized their mistake immediately (in fact before the door opened—for remember that Beckman tried to check the forward motion of the battering ram), and left immediately....

Posted 06 Nov 2013 in Case Notes

Today, the Supreme Court heard argument in Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, which asks whether the Town's legislative-prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause. We previously discussed the case here. Here is a transcript of the oral argument. And here is a recap from Lyle Denniston. He concludes by building on a comment from Justice Kagan: Justice Kagan tried to sum up: Isn’t the question here, she said, whether public meeting prayers with references to Jesus Christ “will be allowed in a public...

Posted 06 Nov 2013 in Case Notes

Does Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to employment-related discrimination claims, even though Title I of the Act specifically addresses such claims? Answering this "question of first impression" in the circuit, in Brumfield v. City of Chicago, No. 11-2265 (Nov. 6, 2013), the Seventh Circuit today joined the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that Title II does not extend to employment-discrimination claims. Such claims must be brought under Title I. The court determined that because, read in context, Title II unambiguously does not reach employment-discrimination claims, the court need...

Posted 04 Nov 2013 in Case Notes
Eagle Cove believed that its religion required it to hold its Bible camp in only one place: on its lake-side property in Oneida County, Wisconsin. But the County had zoned the property for residential use only. When Eagle Cove asked the County to re-zone the property, the County refused. When Eagle Cove asked for a conditional use permit so that it could hold the Bible camp anyway, the County denied that too.Wisc-lake Did the County's denials violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act? In Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Center v. Town of Woodboro, No. 13-1274 (Oct. 30, 2013), the Seventh Circuit said "no." It affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the County and for the Town of Woodboro. No Total Exclusion One provision of RLUIPA provides that

Posted 18 Oct 2013 in Case Notes
The first significant case affecting local governments in this new Supreme Court term  -- Madigan v. Levin -- ended poorly. The Court resolved the case with a DIG -- the Court dismissed it as improvidently granted. Supreme Court3 What went wrong? And what can we learn from it about appellate jurisdiction? An Important Question The case had all the hallmarks of a classic Supreme Court case. The question presented was important. It asked whether when a state or local government employee alleges that his employer has discriminated against him because of his age, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") provides his exclusive remedy, or whether he may also bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the discrimination violates the Constitution's Equal-Protection Clause. The question had divided the lower courts. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its holding -- that the ADEA does not prevent the employee from bringing a Section 1983 claim -- created a deep circuit split. And it had far-reaching implications. It could literally impact every state and local government. What Went Wrong? So why would the Court, after granting cert. and hearing oral argument, suddenly change its mind and toss the case?

Posted 23 Sep 2013 in Case Notes

The Ninth Circuit issued its decision Friday in Pacific Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, No. 11-55460. In the case, plaintiffs alleged that a City ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the Equal Protection Clause because the ordinance had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug users from opening in most residential districts. Although the district court had granted summary judgment for the City, the Ninth...