Case Notes

Home > Case Notes (Page 23)

Posted 12 Mar 2014 in Case Notes
That is the question presented in SCOTUSblog's Petition of the Day.Supreme Court3 The Fourth Circuit ruled in Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013), that
absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.
Frederick County's cert petition argues that this creates a circuit split that the Court should resolve:

Posted 10 Mar 2014 in Case Notes
Congress grants a railroad a right-of-way across public land. RailroadROW The federal government then grants the land to a private landowner, who takes the parcel subject to the railroad right-of-way. The railroad later abandons the right-of-way. Does the right-of-way interest revert to the federal government? Or does the parcel owner gain full and unburdened rights to the property? This morning,  in Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, No. 12-1173, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the federal government does not retain an interest in the abandoned right-of-way.  As Chief Justice Roberts explained,

Posted 07 Mar 2014 in Case Notes
The Ninth Circuit has denied the sua sponte call for en banc review in Pacific Shore Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, No. 11-55460, a case that we have written about previously here. NinthCircuitJudge O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Tallman, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta, filed a dissental, that is, a dissent from the denial of en banc review. It appears to be telegraphing that the Supreme Court should consider the case:

The panel’s opinion in these consolidated cases invents an entirely unprecedented theory of actionable government discrimination: sinister intent in the enactment of facially neutral legislation can generate civil liability without evidence of discriminatory effect. Such unwarranted expansion

Posted 03 Mar 2014 in Case Notes

Last year, this blog discussed three recent courts of appeals decisions involving local-housing regulations aimed at a person's immigration status. This morning, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two of the cases,  Farmers Branch v. Villas at Parkside and Hazleton v. Lozano. Both decisions had preempted local ordinances. Image courtesy of Flickr by prathap ramamurthy (creative-commons license, no changes made)....

Posted 27 Jan 2014 in Case Notes
Closed signMay a city require adult bookstores but not other establishments to close between midnight and 10am every night and all day Sunday? In Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis, No. 13-1500 (Jan. 24, 2014), the Seventh Circuit said no. It struck down the City of Indianapolis's requirement, which a district court had previously upheld. Although the City claimed that the restriction would lead to fewer armed robberies at or near the bookstores, the court held that "cities must protect readers from robbers rather than reduce risks by closing bookstores." In the court's view, "[t]hat the City's regulation takes the form of closure is the nub of the problem." First, the court found that the evidence supporting the City's justification is "weak as a statistical matter": the data "do not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets." Second, the court noted that although

Posted 13 Jan 2014 in Case Notes, IMLA Briefs

This morning, the Supreme Court called for the views of the United States Solicitor General ("CVSG") on whether the Court should grant cert in Comptroller of the Treasury of Md v. Wynne, No. 13-485. The case concerns how the dormant commerce clause limits local taxation. The Court uses the CVSG procedure with respect to only about 10 petitions a year. It indicates at least some degree of interest: the chances of a cert-grant increase significantly in such cases. IMLA and its partners filed the only amicus brief in the case, which...

Posted 08 Jan 2014 in Case Notes, IMLA Briefs
Local governments often establish fixed buffer zones to eliminate congestion and to ensure public safety. Does the First Amendment require a significant change in current local practices?Barricade Next Wednesday, January 15th, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that could address that question. McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 concerns whether a Massachusetts law that bars entering or remaining within a 35-foot radius of a reproductive-health-care facility violates the First Amendment. The First Circuit upheld the law as a reasonable, content-neutral limit. Local governments have filed two important amicus curiae briefs in the case. First, IMLA joined the National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, the International City/County Management Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors in a brief urging the Court to respect state and local governments' need to establish buffer zones to protect public safety. The brief offers a number of examples

Posted 16 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
When T-Mobile sought to place a cell tower in a park owned by the City of Huntington Beach, California, the City granted the company all the regulatory approvals it required. But the City also informed T-Mobile that before it would finally lease the company the rights to the City property that it needed, the company must first obtain approval from City voters, under an amendment to the City charter known as Measure C.CellTower T-Mobile refused. It claimed that Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7),  preempts this City requirement. Is T-Mobile correct? Not according to the Ninth Circuit, which decided Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, No. 10-56877 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) last week. The court ruled that because Section 332(c)(7) "applies only to local zoning and land use decisions and does not address a municipality's property rights as a landowner," it does not preempt this local requirement, which concerns only how the City may lease its property. Enacted in 1990, Measure C states:

Posted 12 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
In a unanimous decision released Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) applies in only three “exceptional circumstances.”  The Court previously identified those exceptional circumstances in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (NOPSI) (1989). This week, it confirmed, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs et al., that Younger abstention extends no further. Supreme Court The Court reaffirmed that Younger abstention is appropriate, and federal courts should defer to state courts, only when faced with:
  1.  “state criminal prosecutions,”
  2. “civil enforcement proceedings,” or
  3. “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
If none of those exceptional circumstances is present, the federal courts may not invoke Younger abstention. As we discussed previously, Sprint involved two separate actions that Sprint Communications, Inc. initiated against members of the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), one pending in Iowa state court and the other in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.  In both actions,

Posted 05 Dec 2013 in Case Notes
If a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his supervisor, and the employee is removed from duty for raising those concerns, does the employee have a viable First Amendment retaliation claim?Policecar In Hagen v. City of Eugene, No. 12-35492 (Dec. 3, 2013), the Ninth Circuit ruled that a public employee did not have a viable First Amendment claim under the particular circumstances there. The court ruled that, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the employee, he was speaking as a public employee, not a private citizen. The case involved a City police officer, Brian Hagen, who noticed that members of his SWAT team were often firing their weapons accidentally and negigently. Hagen tried to make his concerns about the team "as public as possible" by sending e-mails and raising the issue  in meetings. Eventually, Hagen was removed from the K-9 team. Hagen claimed that the City and senior officers had retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.