Case Notes

The Supreme Court keeps on accepting First Amendment cases—perhaps because among the current Court there is much agreement on the First Amendment, so being down a Justice doesn’t matter. This does not bode well for state and local governments, like North Carolina in this case. For better or worse, this case like Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, accepted in September, gives the Supreme Court a chance to refine its holding in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015).

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide cases accusing federal government officials at the highest levels of mistreating people investigated for possible terrorist connections after 9/11. All Supreme Court qualified immunity cases, including Ziglar v. Turkmen, Ashcroft v. Turkmen, and Hasty v. Turkmen, affect state and local governments. These cases raise issues that frequently come up in run-of-the-mill qualified immunity cases, in particular, whether the court defined the “established law” at a high level of generality instead of considering the specific facts of the case when deciding whether to grant or deny qualified immunity.

The question the Supreme Court will decide in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman is whether state “no-surcharge” laws that prohibit vendors from charging more to credit-card customers but allows them to charge less to cash customers violates the First Amendment. Here is why this case matters to local governments: An amicus brief filed on behalf of a number of retailers asking the Court to hear this case and overturn the Second Circuit decision argues that the Court should use this case as an opportunity to rule that strict (almost always fatal) scrutiny should apply to restrictions on commercial speech per Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015). In Reed the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on speech. In the Reed opinion, the Court did not extend its holding to the commercial speech context where states and local governments historically have had more latitude to regulate speech.

McLane v. EEOC is a case only an (employment) lawyer could love. When the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigates allegations of employment discrimination if the employer refuses to provide the information the EEOC requests it will issue a subpoena demanding the employer produce the information. If the employer refuses to comply with the subpoena the EEOC may ask a court to enforce it.

In an opinion published this morning in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Harris ("NIFL"), the Ninth Circuit has held that California may require licensed pregnancy-related clinics to provide patients with notice about the existence of publicly-funded family-planning services without violating the First Amendment. California may also require unlicensed clinics to provide notice stating that they are not licensed. This case may be of interest to IMLA members, particularly as the opinion notes that a city attorney may be a proper defendant in an action challenging a state-wide statute that gives a city attorney power to enforce the statute.

Trouble over phantom accounts isn’t the only problem Wells Fargo is currently facing. Cities have sued Wells Fargo and Bank of America for reverse redlining (lending to equally qualified minorities on less favorable terms than whites). In its Supreme Court amicus brief in Wells Fargo v. City of Miami and Bank of America v. City of Miami the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) argues that Miami, and other cities across the country, should have “standing” to sue banks under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for economic harm caused to cities by discriminatory lending practices.

If complying with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is difficult, it is even more difficult to ensure that another entity is complying as well. In Ivy v. Morath the Supreme Court will decide when state and local governments are responsible for ensuring that a private actor complies with the ADA. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) argues they should be responsible when the private actor may fairly be said to be implementing a service, program, or activity of the public entity itself.

Is the North Carolina legislature in a “Catch-22” or are its problems entirely of its own making? The Supreme Court might weigh in on these questions in McCrory v. Harris. McCrory v. Harris is a typical redistricting case in at least two respects. First, it raises so many legal issues that it is impossible to know what the Supreme Court will focus on. Second, beyond all the technical legal arguments, plaintiffs’ fundamental objection to the redistricting plan is familiar:  they claim the legislature packed minority voters into safe minority districts under the guise of complying with the Voting Right Act (VRA) to reduce minority voters’ influence in other districts. North Carolina claims it is caught in a “Catch-22.”