Posted 30 Jan 2015 in Commentary
To the casual Supreme Court watcher Holt v. Hobbs will probably be known and remembered more for John Oliver’s rendition of the oral argument featuring dogs posed as Supreme Court Justices rather than what the Court held.  But, for Gregory Holt, and other inmates who have been not been allowed to grow half inch beards, it is the holding they will remember. The Supreme Court held unanimously that an inmate’s rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Rights Act (RLUIPA) were violated when he was not allowed to grow a half inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.  This case will affect correctional institutions with no-beard policies and may provide lower court’s guidance in evaluating RLUIPA claims in the corrections and land use context.  

Posted 28 Jan 2015 in Commentary, IMLA Briefs
Commentary by Bill Brinton, Rogers Towers, Jacksonville, Florida During the oral argument in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, Reed’s counsel, David Cortman of Lawrenceville, Georgia, recommended that temporary signs relating to a one-time event, such as an election or anything else that occurs on a particular date, be taken down within the same time period after that event. He represented to the Court that “in fact the Washington, D.C., municipal regulations have that exact code . . . it’s one we would recommend to the Court. . . . I believe it’s 13605.” According to Mr. Cortman, “what it says is all temporary signs should be treated the same, period. . . . Every temporary sign can be up for 180 days.” See Oral Argument Transcript at pages 16-17. As a practitioner who defends and drafts sign regulations, I found a number of the propositions made by the petitioners to be impractical and contrary to common sense. I was curious about the D.C. municipal regulation 13605, and when I looked for the regulation I could not find it. There was a good reason. It is not a law at this time, nor has it ever been the law. There is simply a draft proposal from 2012 for a new Title 13, Chapter 6, that would provide regulation for temporary signs, but the same is still under review by the District, and has been undergoing further changes since 2012 based upon public input.

Posted 26 Jan 2015 in Tips and Tactics

Occasionally an attorney will propose that the parties stipulate to the meaning of a relevant statute.  Such stipulations have no legal force and will be disregarded by the court.  Numerous cases so hold across the United States:   “Parties to a dispute cannot stipulate to the law and assume that the court will follow blindly an incorrect interpretation of the law, especially in an unsettled and everchanging area.” Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE-3J, 739 F.2d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. 1984)   “Parties...

Posted 26 Jan 2015 in Case Notes, Commentary

Per the adoption of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), accommodating persons with disabilities is the norm.  Twenty-five years after the Act’s passage, the Supreme Court will decide whether it applies to police officers arresting a mentally ill suspect one who is armed and violent. In City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan the Supreme Court will decide whether, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), police must accommodate a suspect’s mental illness when arresting him or her.  The...

Posted 20 Jan 2015 in Case Notes, Commentary

On Friday the Supreme Court elevated this term from mostly meat and potatoes to historic by agreeing to hear four same-sex marriage cases.  The Court will decide whether it is constitutional for states to prohibit same-sex marriage and whether states may refuse to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed out of state.   While the Court refused to hear a number of cases presenting the same issues earlier in the term, these grants came as little surprise.  Between then and now the Sixth...

Posted 15 Jan 2015 in Case Notes, Commentary

The City of Roswell lost its case before the Supreme Court on what some might describe as a mere technicality--but overall local governments won.   In T-Mobile South v. City of Roswell the Supreme Court held 6-3 that the Telecommunications Act (TCA) requires local governments to provide reasons when denying an application to build a cell phone tower.  The reasons do not have to be stated in the denial letter but must be articulated “with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially...

Posted 24 Dec 2014 in IMLA Briefs
The State and Local Legal Center’s (SLLC) Supreme Court amicus brief in Los Angeles v. Patel, which IMLA joined, is all that you expect from an amicus brief…and more.  It makes not one but all the usual amicus arguments:  don’t rule that state and local governments can be sued for yet another thing, if you rule against the city in this case many other cities and states will be affected, and a ruling against the city will likely impact many similar but unrelated statutes and ordinance. hotel    A Los Angeles ordinance requires hotel and motel operators to keep specific information about their guests and allows police to inspect the registries without warrants.  Motel operators claim this ordinance is facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit agreed, because the ordinance fails to expressly provide for pre-compliance judicial review before police can inspect the registry.    The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in Los Angeles v. Patel arguing that Fourth Amendment facial challenges should be disfavored and that if the ordinance in this case is unconstitutional similar hotel registry ordinances across the country—and laws and ordinances requiring record keeping and inspection of other businesses—may be unconstitutional.  A facial challenge to the ordinance in this case requires a court to determine whether all searches that might be conducted pursuant to the ordinance are unconstitutional (as opposed to an as-applied challenge where the court would decide whether a particular search under the ordinance violates the Fourth Amendment).  The SLLC argues that Fourth Amendment facial challenges don’t make sense because whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment depends on whether it is reasonable, which is necessarily a fact-based determination.  Under some set of facts almost any search would be reasonable.  For example, depending on the facts, warrantless searches of hotel registries could be reasonable under the “community care-taking exception,” because the registry is “in plain view,” or because of “exigent circumstances.”

Posted 21 Dec 2014 in Monday Morning Review

Here are last week's published decisions involving local governments: Fourth Circuit Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, No. 13-2160 (Dec. 17, 2014): In appeal of district court order finding that County prayers violated Establishment Clause, the court found that County's  appeal was untimely. Fifth Circuit Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., No. 12-60264 (Dec. 12, 2014): The court ruled that school board violated student's freedom of speech by disciplining him for a song that he wrote off campus, that he posted to the Internet from his home computer, and that...

Posted 21 Dec 2014 in Case Notes, Commentary
In Heien v. North Carolina the Supreme Court held that a reasonable mistake of law can provide reasonable suspicion to uphold a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. A police officer pulled over a car that had only one working brake light because he believed that North Carolina law required both brake lights to work.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals, interpreting a statute over a half a century old, concluded only one working brake light is required. highway stop When the vehicle’s occupants behaved suspiciously, the officer asked to search the car.  They consented, and the officer found cocaine.  The owner of the car argued that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because driving with one working brake light doesn’t violate North Carolina law. The Supreme Court has long held that reasonable mistakes of fact do not undermine Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.  Justice Roberts reasoned in this 8-1 decision:  “Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.”

Posted 15 Dec 2014 in Case Notes, Commentary, IMLA Briefs
In a unanimous opinion in Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, the Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not require hourly employees to be paid for the time they spend waiting to undergo and undergoing security screenings.  Government employees who work in courthouses, correctional institutions, and warehouses routinely go through security screening at the beginning and/or end of the workday.   SCT stairs Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro worked at warehouses filling Amazon.com orders.  They claimed that they should have been paid for the time they spent waiting and going through security screenings to prevent theft at the end of each shift. Under the FLSA employers only have to pay “non-exempt” employees for preliminary and postliminary activities that are “integral and indispensable” to a principal activity.  According to the Court, an activity is “integral and indispensable” to a principal activity “if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.”  The Court concluded that security screenings were not intrinsic to retrieving and packing products and that Integrity Staffing Solutions could have eliminated the screenings altogether without impairing employees’ ability to complete their work.