Imagine having to operate two jails:  one for pretrial detainees and one for post-conviction detainees.  This could be the practical effect of Kingsley v. Hendrickson, depending on how the Supreme Court rules.  The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case, which IMLA joined, arguing that the same or similar standard should apply to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees and post-conviction detainees to avoid this result.

Beginning in the mid-2000s numerous states adopted “Jessica’s” laws requiring GPS monitoring of certain sex offenders.  These statutes have been challenged on a number of grounds—including that they violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.  Eight states, including North Carolina, monitor sex offenders for life. The Supreme Court ruling that GPS monitoring of certain sex offenders is a Fourth Amendment search doesn’t invalidate these statutes.  But if the lower court—and ultimately the Supreme Court—rule GPS monitoring is an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search—state statutes nationwide could be unconstitutional.

Young v. United Parcel Service presents a dilemma most employers, including states, can relate to.  What should an employer do if a pregnant employee’s job requires that she lift an amount well above what her doctor has approved during pregnancy? The specific issue the Court had to decide in this case was whether an employer violated Title VII because it accommodated many but not all nonpregnancy-related disabilities but did not accommodate pregnancy-related disabilities.  Maybe, the Supreme Court ruled in a 6-3 decision.

Quick update for those of you following the hotly contested Second Amendment case Peruta v. County of San Diego.  Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit agreed to an en banc rehearing.  The Court will take up the issue of whether San Diego County’s “good cause” permitting requirement, governing concealed weapons permits, impermissibly infringes on the Second Amendment right to bear arms.  The California Attorney General and other groups brought petitions for rehearing after unsuccessfully attempting to intervene in the case last year when the San...

In the only SCOTUS case of the term where the issue of race is front and center (other than high profile Fair Housing Act case) the Court sided with minority voters. Unsurprisingly, Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion. In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama the Supreme Court held 5-4 that when determining whether unconstitutional racial gerrymandering occurred—if race was a “predominant motivating factor” in creating districts—one-person-one-vote should be a background factor, not a factor balanced against the use of race.  And Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) does not require a covered jurisdiction to maintain a particular percent of minority voters in minority-majority districts.  The Court sent this case back to the lower court to reconsider in light of its opinion.  While this case involves state legislative redistricting, the legal standards at issue apply to redistricting at the local level as well.  

In 2006 the Department of Labor (DOL) stated in an opinion letter that mortgage loan officers were eligible for overtime but then changed its mind in 2010 in an “Administrator’s Interpretation.” In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association the Supreme Court held unanimously that federal agencies do not have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) before changing an interpretive rule, like the 2006 opinion letter in this case.  The Court overturned a nearly 20 year-old precedent from the D.C. Circuit, Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, which the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) argued in an amicus brief that the Court should affirm.  Paralyzed Veterans held that an agency must use APA notice-and-comment when significantly altering an interpretive rule that interprets a legislative rule. 

In Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation the Supreme Court held 7-2 that railroads can be compared to their competitors when determining whether a tax is discriminatory in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act).  Different taxes paid by railroads and their competitors must be compared with determining whether a tax railroads pay is discriminatory.  The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case disagreeing with the Court’s first holding and agreeing with its second holding. The 4-R Act prohibits state and local governments from imposing taxes that discriminate against rail carriers (railroads).  Railroads in Alabama pay a four percent sales tax on diesel fuel as do other commercial and industrial purchasers.  Motor carriers (trucks) pay an excise tax of 19-cents per gallon and no sales tax.  Water carriers pay no sales or excise tax on diesel fuel. 

There is no way to know for sure why Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl stating that the “legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill.”  But even if you don’t read the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) amicus brief’s criticism of Quill and merely scan its table of authorities, you will notice that two of the three non-case related citations in Justice Kennedy’s opinion come from the SLLC’s brief.

For Justice Kennedy it was his questions, for Chief Justice Roberts it was his silence… Today the Supreme Court heard oral argument in King v. Burwell, where it will decide whether federal health insurance exchanges, operating in 34 states, can offer subsidies to middle and low income purchasers of insurance under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Simply put, the Court must decide whether it agrees with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that the following statutory language, “established by the State,” can include federal exchanges too. All eyes and ears were on Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts during the argument.  Justice Kennedy is the Court’s “swing” Justice, and Chief Justice Roberts crucially concluded in the first Supreme Court challenge to the ACA that the individual mandate is a constitutional “tax.” 

Don’t assume that an argument should be discarded because it is supported only an old case.  For example, plaintiffs relied on Stevens v. Los Angeles Dock & Terminal Co., 20 Cal.App.743 (2d Dist. 1912), and defendant  More-Gas first noted that Stevens is “’a 100 year old case that has never been cited by another California case.’” The court in McGuire v. More-Gas Investments, LLC, 220 Cal.App.4th 512, 526 (3d Dist. 2013), responded: That fact is of no significance. While it is true Stevens has never been cited by any published appellate decision in California, that does not undercut the validity of the reasoning in the case. Indeed, the principle applied in Stevens is well known in the common law, including here in California. An appellate court in New York that cited Stevens over 70 years ago succinctly articulated that principle as follows: As McGuire illustrates, age of a compelling case is not necessarily a matter of consequence.  What are some ways to show why the case is compelling when it has never been cited by another California court?