15 Jan Case v. Montana Summary
Case v. Montana, no. 24-624 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026).
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan with concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court in rejecting the petitioner’s argument that a probable cause standard is needed to justify warrantless entry in emergency aid scenarios.
Law enforcement made a visit to the home of William Case based on a call from his girlfriend expressing concern that Case was suicidal. They entered though an unlocked door, and as they sought to determine whether Case needed help, he jumped out at an officer, appearing to hold a weapon. Case was shot in the abdomen and received aid; officers then found a handgun nearby. He was charged with “knowingly or purpose fully caus[ing] reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in [the officer] when he pointed a pistol, or what reasonably appeared to be a pistol, at [the officer.]”
Case filed motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause and to suppress evidence obtained from the “illegal search of Defendant and his residence.” The district court denied both motions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the lower court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding the warrantless entry was justified based on “objective, specific, and articulable facts” to conclude that Case required assistance, justifying their warrantless entry.
The issue before the Court was:
Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the Supreme Court held that before police officers enter a home without a warrant, they must have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” But state courts and federal Circuits were divided on whether the “objectively reasonable basis” standard required police making a warrantless entry to have probable cause to believe an emergency exists or some lesser level of suspicion.
Justice Kagan reaffirmed the Brigham City standard. As she puts it, “The question presented is whether that standard means that officers must have “probable cause” for the intrusion, as they typically would when investigating a crime. We hold it does not. The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal context, and we decline to transplant it to this different one. Brigham City’s reasonableness standard means just what it says, with no further gloss.”
While the Kagan opinion affirms the judgment of the Montana high court, it does not adopt the Montana reasoning. The Montana court had relied on a “community caretaker” rule which found a home entry “reasonable” when an officer has “specific and articulable facts” from which to “suspect” that someone needs help. That test, as the Montana court’s dissenting justices noted, evokes the Fourth Amendment standard applying to brief, investigative street stops: “reasonable suspicion” based on “specific and articulable facts.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968); 553 P. 3d, at 999 (McKinnon, J.). But Brigham City had never adopted Terry’s reasonable-suspicion standard for home entries.
Case had contended that police officers must “have probable cause to believe [an occupant is] seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury” based mainly on the Fourth Amendment’s recognition of the “sanctity of the home.” Given that special status, he argued, a home entry’s aid-giving, “noninvestigatory purpose” should make no difference: The same probable cause principles used in deciding whether “criminal activity [is] afoot” should apply as well in “assessing the risk and gravity of an emergency.”
Justice Kagan disagreed: “We decline Case’s invitation to put a new probable-cause spin onto Brigham City. “‘[T]he probable-cause standard,’ this Court has often stated, “is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.”
We are gratified that the Court adopted the more expansive “objectively reasonable” standard, which should enhance law enforcement’s ability to assist those in need. LGLC (NLC, NACo, ICMA, and IMLA) had urged the Court to reach that result in our amicus brief authored by Nadia Sarkis and James Nikraftar of Miller Barondess LLP.