25 Jun Supreme Court Decides Spending Clause / RLUIPA Prisoner Case In Favor of State Officials
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court held that statutes like the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) that are enacted pursuant to Congress’ Spending Clause power can “bind only those who voluntarily and knowingly undertake obligations by agreement with the federal government.” Because employees of a state prison in this case had not agreed to the conditions set forth in RLUIPA, (only the state had agreed to be sued in accepting funding), the prisoner in this case could not sue the prison officials for damages under RLUIPA.
Mr. Landor is a Rastafarian and as a part of his religious beliefs, he does not cut his hair. He was in prison in Louisiana and toward the end of his sentence, he was transferred to a new facility. He was concerned the prison officials might try to cut his hair pursuant to the prison’s grooming policy, so he brought a copy of a binding Fifth Circuit decision directly on point, which held that RLUIPA bars prisons from cutting Rastafarian’s hair. He handed the decision to the prison officials (and warden) who responded by throwing the decision in the trash and shaving his head.
He sued the Louisiana Department of Correction (LDOC) and the individual officers responsible under RLUIPA. The LDOC got dropped from the suit and all that remained before the Supreme Court was the challenge under RLUIPA for money damages against the state prison officials in their private capacities.
RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Spending Clause authority, and it imposes various conditions on federal funds distributed to state prison systems. One of those conditions is that state prison systems must refrain from imposing “substantial burden[s] on the religious exercise[s]” (absent some exceptional circumstances) and they must consent to suits by injured parties asserting violations of RLUIPA.
The issue in this case was whether “consistent with the Constitution, a plaintiff may bring an RLUIPA suit against individuals, like the officers in this case, who have not formed any agreement with the federal government.” In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is barred from such a suit because Congress can only condition funds based on “voluntary and knowing consent of those who must bear them.”
The Court indicated that contract principles inform whether consent exists. For example, there is no consent if a contract is coerced, which the Court reminds us is a reason to find a Spending Clause condition invalid – i.e., if it is akin to a “gun to the head.” Similarly, the Court has required clear and unambiguous language to alert a grant recipient to any condition on federal funding, which is another common law contractual principle that the Court has adopted in its Spending Clause jurisprudence.
The requirement of knowing and voluntary consent ends the inquiry in this case because the case only involves a suit against the individual employees of the prison in their personal capacities. There are no allegations that they entered into any agreement themselves with the federal government, let alone knowingly and voluntarily consented to be sued under RLUIPA.
This case is worth reviewing for the discussion on the Spending Clause for anyone dealing with (or litigating cases involving) conditions on grants as there is some strong language in there reaffirming the parameters of the federal government’s ability to impose conditions on federal funding. There may also be other arguments local governments can extract from this case in terms of the limitations on private rights of action under Spending Clause legislation.
You can review the decision here.