27 Jun Supreme Court Holds Universal Injunctions Exceed District Court Authority
Today, in Trump v. Casa, the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not confer the equitable authority on federal courts to issue universal injunctions, calling such injunctions “conspicuously nonexistent for most of our Nation’s history.” The practical implications of the Court’s decision are significant for local governments, particularly in the context of current federal grant litigation. Though the use of universal injunctions will now be prohibited, there are nuances to the decision that did not completely close the door to non-party relief in limited circumstances that are discussed below. The case came to the Court in the context of the birthright citizenship executive order, but the federal government did not ask the Supreme Court to weigh in on the constitutionality of that order and the Court therefore did not reach the merits.
On President Trump’s first day in office, he signed Executive Order No. 14160 entitled Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship (“EO”), which identified circumstances in which persons born in the United States would not be considered citizens. Several lawsuits quickly followed, including suits filed by individuals, organizations, and States, which sought to enjoin the enforcement of the EO. In each case, the district court concluded that the EO was likely unlawful and entered a universal preliminary injunction, prohibiting the administration from enforcing the EO as to anyone in the country. The federal government sought a stay of those universal injunctions pending litigation and each federal appellate court denied the stay. The federal government then filed emergency applications for a stay of those universal injunctions with the Supreme Court. The federal government did not ask the Supreme Court to reach the merits of the Executive Order.
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Barrett, the Supreme Court held that universal injunctions exceed the authority of federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Judiciary Act of 1789 confers federal courts with jurisdiction over “all suits … in equity,” and while equitable authority is “flexible,” it is not “freewheeling.”
To determine if a universal injunction is an available type of equitable relief, the Court asks whether it is the type of remedy “‘traditionally accorded by courts of equity’ at our country’s inception.” See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 319 (1999). The question is therefore “whether universal injunctions are sufficiently ‘analogous’ to the relief issued ‘by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act.’” Id. Per the Court, “the answer is no: Neither the universal injunction nor any analogous form of relief was available in the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the founding.” The Court explained that there was “no remedy ‘remotely like a national injunction’” at that time, rejecting the Respondents’ and dissents arguments that a bill of peace was an analogous form of equitable relief at the time of founding.
Moreover, the Court noted that the practice of universal injunctions did not emerge until the mid-twentieth century, providing further evidence of the lack of historical foundation. And here, the Court noted, that the vast majority of the universal injunctions have been deployed more recently against Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden, including approximately 25 that have been issued in the first 100 days of the second Trump administration.
The Respondents argued that a universal injunction is necessary to provide them with complete relief in this case. The Court agreed that the “complete-relief principle has deep roots in equity”, but the principle does not justify the use of universal injunctions. The Court concluded the individual and associational plaintiffs can obtain complete relief without a universal injunction. After all, a pregnant plaintiff can sue, and a court can order that her child will not be denied citizenship. Extending the injunction to other non-parties would not render her relief more complete.
According to the majority, the complete relief theory for the States is “more complicated,” and the Court left open the possibility that a universal injunction may be an appropriate remedy for the States to obtain complete relief in this case. The States argued that given the flow of travel between States, a “patchwork injunction” would be unworkable. The federal government disputed that, and the Court declined to decide the issue and instead, remanded that question to the lower courts to decide in the first instance. The upshot is that this particular EO may still be enjoined on a universal basis by a district court if the district court determines that is the only way to provide the States with complete relief. However, the question of complete relief, as well as the merits of the EO itself, will likely need to be resolved by the Supreme Court eventually.
In addition to the complete relief theory sometimes supporting a universal injunction, the Court also noted that there may be some types of injuries, such a racial gerrymandering, where it is “all but impossible for courts to craft relief that is complete and benefits only the named plaintiffs.” Additionally, the Court specifically indicated it was not resolving the separate question of whether the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,” allows federal courts to vacate or set aside federal agency action (which would resemble a universal injunction in practice).
There were several separate writings, including concurrences by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor authored the principal dissent, which was joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson and Justice Jackson authored a separate dissent.
Justice Thomas wrote separately to note that the “complete relief” theory is a ceiling, and it should not be considered a mandate. He cautioned that the “complete relief” theory should not be used to revive universal injunctions.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately regarding his concerns that allowing third party-standing (i.e., allowing States to sue on behalf of their residents) as well as the deployment of class wide relief could both potentially undermine the impact of the Court’s ruling. On the latter point, Justice Alito provided: “district courts should not view today’s decision as an invitation to certify nationwide classes without scrupulous adherence to the rigors of Rule 23. Otherwise, the universal injunction will return from the grave under the guise of ‘nationwide class relief,’ and today’s decision will be of little more than minor academic interest.”
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of ignoring the “patent unlawfulness” of the EO and accused the federal government of playing games by only seeking review of the universal injunction issue and not the merits. She also pointed out that under the majority’s holding, other constitutional rights may not be safe from a different administration, such as a hypothetical order that seeks to seize firearms from law-abiding citizens.
This case is important for local governments as universal injunctions have been used in the past in litigation involving challenges to changes to federal grant conditions. Several courts during the first Trump administration issued universal injunctions against the administration’s application of immigration conditions to the Byrne Jag grant. However, many of the current legal challenges to the termination of grants or conditions on grants have not involved universal injunctions (likely because courts and litigants were aware the Supreme Court would be weighing in on the issue and many Justices had previously expressed skepticism over their practice). Any cases that do involve universal injunctions would likely need to be modified in light of the Court’s ruling. As the various opinions allude, class action lawsuits may be another avenue for parties seeking broader relief.
To read the Court’s decision, click here.