25 Feb SCOTUS Decides Attorney’s Fee Case in Win for Local Governments
Today, in Lackey v. Stinnie, the Supreme Court held that a party does not “prevail” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the purposes of attorney’s fees based on obtaining a preliminary injunction, even if the defendant’s conduct later moots the case. This case was a win for local governments as attorney’s fees awards can be significant and a contrary result would undermine the public fisc.
In this case, a group of Virginia drivers whose licenses were suspended due to their failure to pay certain fines sued the Virginia Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicle under §1983, claiming the law requiring the license suspension was unconstitutional. The district court preliminarily enjoined the Commissioner from enforcing the statute. The court based the injunction on the drivers’ likelihood of success on the merits as well as finding the other preliminary injunction factors weighed finding in their favor. The Commissioner did not appeal the grant of a preliminary injunction. However, before the case reached trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the challenged law. The parties agreed the case was moot at this point and stimulated its dismissal. The drivers thereafter sought attorney’s fees under §1988, claiming “prevailing party” status under the statute.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in certain civil rights cases, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” By way of background, in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held for a party to “prevail” under §1988 for the purposes of attorney’s fee awards, the relief must be “judicially sanctioned.” In other words, “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” to have prevailed under the statute. Id. at 605. Then, in Sole v. Wyner, the Court held that a party has not “prevailed” under §1988 through the award of a preliminary injunction if that injunction is later reversed by a final decision in the case. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, (2007).
The question presented in this case was left open by Buckhannon and Sole: whether a party that obtains preliminary relief, but never obtains judicially sanctioned relief because of the defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, may be the “prevailing party” who qualifies for an award of attorney’s fees under §1988(b).
The Fourth Circuit sitting en banc, found in favor of the drivers, concluding: “When a preliminary injunction provides the plaintiff concrete, irreversible relief on the merits of her claim and becomes moot before final judgment because no further court-ordered assistance proves necessary, the subsequent mootness of the case does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees.” Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F.4th 200, 210 (4th Cir. 2023). The Fourth Circuit then explained that “all preliminary injunctions” are “solidly merits-based” and will satisfy the “judicial imprimatur” necessary under Buckhannon.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[a] party ‘prevails’ when a court conclusively resolves his claim by granting enduring relief on the merits that alters the legal relationship between the parties.” The Court explained that “both the change in relationship and its permanence must result from a judicial order.” In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned that under the “American Rule,” a prevailing litigant is not ordinarily entitled to collect attorney’s fees unless there is express statutory authorization. Here, the question was what the term “prevailing party” meant at the time Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act in 1976.
The term “prevailing party” is a legal term of art, which means that courts presume that when Congress “borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.’” And in this case, the Court concluded that “Black’s Law Dictionary [at the time the statute was enacted] defined ‘prevailing party’ as the party “who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it.” The term per Black’s Law Dictionary “does not depend upon the degree of success at different stages of the suit, but whether, at the end of the suit, or other proceeding, the party who has made a claim against the other, has successfully maintained it.”
The Court emphasized the transient nature of the preliminary injunctions and held that “[b]ecause preliminary injunctions do not conclusively resolve the rights of parties on the merits, they do not confer prevailing party status.” In terms of the voluntary change, which mooted the case, the Court explained that enduring change between the parties must be “judicially sanctioned.” The Court reasoned that its holding “flows naturally” from its prior precedents including Buckhannon and Sole. Finally, the Court noted that because this is a statutory interpretation case, if Congress believes parties should be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees based on a preliminary injunction, it may amend the statutory language.
The Local Government Legal Center (NACo, NLC, IMLA, and GFOA) filed an amicus brief in this case, which was authored by Joshua Skinner, Benjamin Gibbs, & Alexnader Lindwall with the City of Arlington, Texas. The amicus brief explained how interpreting “prevailing party” to allow for attorney’s fees for preliminary injunctions would harm local governments by discouraging local governments from voluntarily changing suspect policies, incentivizing expensive litigation, and draining public resources.
To read the Court’s decision, click here.
To read the LGLC’s amicus brief, click here.